Protected Concerted Activity and Non-Unionized Employee Strikes: Worker Rights in Canada in the Time of COVID-19 by Slinn, Sara J.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
Volume 57 
Issue 3 Volume 57, Issue 3 (Fall 2020) 
Special Issue: Law in the Time of COVID 
Article 4 
1-19-2021 
Protected Concerted Activity and Non-Unionized Employee 
Strikes: Worker Rights in Canada in the Time of COVID-19 
Sara J. Slinn 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Article 
Citation Information 
Slinn, Sara J.. "Protected Concerted Activity and Non-Unionized Employee Strikes: Worker Rights in 
Canada in the Time of COVID-19." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 57.3 (2021) : 605-635. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol57/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. 
Protected Concerted Activity and Non-Unionized Employee Strikes: Worker Rights 
in Canada in the Time of COVID-19 
Abstract 
During the pandemic employees in the US have engaged in a wave of strikes, protests, and other 
collective action over concerns about unsafe working conditions, and many of these involved non-
unionized workers in the private sector. Similar employee protests were notably absent in Canada. This 
article examines the differences in labour legislation between the US and Canada, which may help to 
explain these diverging experiences, primarily: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 7 
protection for concerted activity, and the NLRA section 502 ability for a good faith strike due to 
abnormally dangerous conditions for work. This article outlines and compares the situation of, and 
consequences for, three categories of workers engaging in a strike over fears of workplace safety: 
unionized employees, non-unionized employees, and non-employees, such as independent contractors 
under the NLRA compared to under the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA), as generally representative 
of Canadian labour legislation. In the final section, this article considers how a statutory provision similar 
to the NLRA protected concerted activity provision might be incorporated into Canadian labour legislation 
such as the OLRA. It also considers some more fundamental questions that such changes might prompt 
policymakers to reconsider, including: the focus of our statutory system on “organizing” collective action 
to the exclusion of “mobilizing” collective action, and questions about the potential role of minority 
unionism in our labour legislation system. 
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol57/iss3/4 
605 
Protected Concerted Activity and 
Non-Unionized Employee Strikes: 
Worker Rights in Canada in the Time of 
COVID-19 
SARA J. SLINN 
During the pandemic employees in the US have engaged in a wave of strikes, protests, and 
other collective action over concerns about unsafe working conditions, and many of these 
involved non-unionized workers in the private sector. Similar employee protests were notably 
absent in Canada. This article examines the differences in labour legislation between the US 
and Canada, which may help to explain these diverging experiences, primarily: the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 7 protection for concerted activity, and the NLRA section 
502 ability for a good faith strike due to abnormally dangerous conditions for work. This article 
outlines and compares the situation of, and consequences for, three categories of workers 
engaging in a strike over fears of workplace safety: unionized employees, non-unionized 
employees, and non-employees, such as independent contractors under the NLRA compared 
to under the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA), as generally representative of Canadian 
labour legislation. In the final section, this article considers how a statutory provision similar 
to the NLRA protected concerted activity provision might be incorporated into Canadian 
labour legislation such as the OLRA. It also considers some more fundamental questions 
that such changes might prompt policymakers to reconsider, including: the focus of our 
statutory system on “organizing” collective action to the exclusion of “mobilizing” collective 
action, and questions about the potential role of minority unionism in our labour legislation 
system. 
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean (Research and Institutional Relations), Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University. 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
   
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
606 
I. NON-UNIONIZED EMPLOYEE STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES .................................................... 608 
II. WHAT ABOUT CANADIAN WORKERS?.............................................................................................. 610 
III. NLRA PROTECTION FOR CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND FROM ABNORMALLY 
DANGEROUS CONDITIONS ............................................................................................................... 614 
A. Protected Concerted Activity.............................................................................................. 615 
B. Protected Concerted Activity and Strikes .......................................................................... 618 
C. Strikes and Abnormally Dangerous Conditions................................................................. 619 
D. NLRA Protections for Strikers ........................................................................................... 620 
IV. EMPLOYEE FREEDOMS AND STRIKES UNDER CANADIAN LABOUR LAW ..................................... 621 
A. Freedom to Join and Participate in a Trade Union ............................................................ 622 
B. Regulation of Strikes.......................................................................................................... 623 
C. OLRA Protection for Unionized Strikers ............................................................................ 624 
D. Strikes by Non-Unionized Workers under the OLRA......................................................... 626 
1. Strikes by Workers Excluded from the OLRA ..................................................... 626 
2. Strikes by Non-Employees .................................................................................. 627 
3. Strikes by Non-Unionized Employees................................................................. 627 
V. REVISITING PANDEMIC-RELATED STRIKES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA..................... 628 
VI. CONTEMPLATING PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY FOR CANADIAN EMPLOYEES .................. 630 
A. Establishing the Guarantee................................................................................................ 631 
B. Strikes and Picketing ......................................................................................................... 632 
C. Difficult Questions .............................................................................................................. 633 
VII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 635 
WORKERS AROUND THE GLOBE have been engaging in a startling wave of 
strikes, protests, and other collective action over concerns about unsafe working 
conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of these actions have taken 
place in the United States, across a wide array of sectors and occupations, including 
retail, grocery, delivery, fast food, food processing, manufacturing, postal, transit, 
and health care.1 Many of these collective worker actions involve some of the 
largest and most powerful corporate international employers, such as Amazon, 
McDonald’s, and Whole Foods, as well as smaller enterprises. Remarkably, 
many of these actions have taken place in the private sector by non-unionized 
1. See e.g. Steven Greenhouse, “Is Your Grocery Delivery Worth a Worker’s Life?,” Te New York 
Times (30 March 2020), online: <nytimes.com/2020/03/30/opinion/coronavirus-worker-
Bridget Read, “Every Food and Delivery Strike Happening Over Coronavirus” (27 
May 2020), online: <thecut.com/2020/05/whole-foods-amazon-mcdonalds-among-
strike, virus lockdown protest set for May Day,” CTV News (1 May 2020), online: 
<ctvnews.ca/world/work-safety-strike-virus-lockdown-protest-set-for-may-day-1.4920157> 
[perma.cc/J4TH-PK5J]. 
strike.html> [perma.cc/672Q-FL2F] (providing an overview of US worker safety strikes); 
coronavirus-strikes.html> [perma.cc/L5ZC-3DF5]; Christopher Weber, “Work safety 
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workers. Perhaps most surprising of all is that some of these eforts have been 
efective, leading to improved working conditions for these workers, at least 
for the moment.2 
Te events in the US were widely reported in Canada, involving as they did 
many prominent companies that also operate with many employees in many 
locations in this country. Tis prompted several journalists to ask whether similar 
strikes and actions were planned at these companies’ Canadian workplaces and 
why their Canadian employees weren’t also engaging in such strikes.3 As a recent 
media article asks: “U.S. Workers are Organizing Mass Strikes. Why Aren’t 
Canadian Workers?”4 
Tis article addresses this question. In particular, it considers whether 
diferences in labour legislation between the two countries help to explain why 
non-unionized employees in the US but not in Canada have been engaging in 
these strikes, and the relatively subdued actions of even unionized employees 
in this country. It frst examines and compares worker actions during the 
pandemic in the US and in Canada. Next, it examines the relevant provisions 
of the US National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) underlying these non-union 
strikes, focusing on that Act’s protected concerted activity provision, which is 
not found in Canadian labour statutes.5 To highlight the diferences between 
the US and Canadian legal contexts, it outlines and compares the situation 
of, and consequences for, three categories of workers engaging in a strike over 
2. See e.g. Shirin Ghafary, “Te May Day strike from Amazon, Instacart, and Target workers 
didn’t stop business. It was still a success” (1 May 2020), online: <vox.com/recode/2020/ 
5/1/21244151/may-day-strike-amazon-instacart-target-success-turnout-fedex-protest-
essential-workers-chris-smalls> [perma.cc/ZKN9-4NRX]; Hannah Jackson & Maryam Shah, 
“Instacart announces coronavirus protections amid threats of a strike,” Global News (29 
March 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6748137/coroanvirus-instacart-strike> [perma. 
cc/H7VL-GHRL]; Greenhouse, supra note 1; Kate Taylor, “Te workers that make your food 
put their lives on the line during pandemic. Whether they’re protected now is up to you,” 
Business Insider (25 May 2020), online: <businessinsider.com/workers-new-benefts-in-the-
pandemic-will-they-keep-them-2020-5> [perma.cc/6VGK-MRLT]. 
3. See e.g. Zaid Noorsumar, “U.S. workers are organizing mass strikes. Why aren’t Canadian 
workers?” Vice (13 May 2020), online: <vice.com/en_ca/article/88998z/amazon-workers-are-
organizing-strikes-in-the-us-why-arent-canadian-workers> [perma.cc/U4QP-KD9E]; Te 
Associated Press, “U.S. Amazon and Instacart workers strike to protest COVID-19 hazards 
on the job,” CBC News (31 March 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/business/amazon-instacard-
coronavirus-1.5515868> [perma.cc/2H78-VGTH] (reporting that, when asked, organizers 
of planned US-wide Whole Foods employee strike said they were “unaware of any plans for 
similar actions in Canada”). 
4. Noorsumar, supra note 3. 
5. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC ss 151-69 (1935) at §157 [NLRA]. 
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fears of workplace safety: unionized employees, non-unionized employees, and 
non-employees, such as independent contractors under the NLRA compared to 
under the Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA), as generally representative of 
Canadian labour legislation.6 In the fnal section, this article considers how a 
statutory provision similar to the NLRA protected concerted activity provision 
might be incorporated into Canadian labour legislation, such as the OLRA. It also 
considers some uncomfortable questions that may need to be addressed about the 
nature and scope of our labour relations systems. Tese include questions about 
the fundamental type of collective action recognized by our labour relations 
system, and questions about a potential role for minority unionism. Tis article 
focuses on statutory labour law and does not address treatment of employees’ 
refusal to work pursuant to occupational health and safety legislation.7 
I. NON-UNIONIZED EMPLOYEE STRIKES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
As noted in the introduction, non-unionized employees across many companies, 
industries, and occupations in the US have taken part in strikes and other forms 
of collective action during the pandemic out of fear of unsafe workplaces. In many 
cases, these were also accompanied by complaints of retaliation against those 
workers leading or participating in these activities. One of the most prominent 
examples, involving Amazon, is briefy described below, to ofer a sense of what 
has been occurring and as a basis for comparison with events in Canada at the 
workplaces of this same company and others. 
Amazon workers at many locations in the US have engaged in demonstrations 
and walk-out strikes, demanding better working conditions, such as protective 
equipment, improved sick leave, and sanitizing of facilities. A widely publicized 
example involved an Amazon worker, Chris Smalls, fred hours after organizing 
a strike at an Amazon warehouse on Staten Island to protest the lack of 
safety protection for employees. Amazon contends that he was terminated 
for misconduct; Smalls says it was retaliation.8 Amazon employee actions in 
Chicago have also garnered attention. Tere, workers have engaged in petitions, 
walk-out strikes, and work slowdowns to protest their pandemic working 
6. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sched A [OLRA]. 
7. See e.g. Occupational Health and Safety Act, RSO 1990, c O.1 [OHSA]. 
8. Sarah Jones, “Workers are trying to prevent a deadly COVID-19 disaster,” New York 
Magazine (9 April 2020), online: <nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/04/protesting-workers-are-
trying-to-save-lives.html> [perma.cc/7PGG-DFXK]. 
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conditions.9 Employee leaders were terminated in what DCH1 Amazonians 
United, a non-union worker group, claims was targeted retaliation against these 
employees. Tis group has since fled multiple complaints with the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), claiming interference with these employees’ 
right to engage in protected concerted activity.10 
Similar episodes of non-unionized employee strikes seeking safe work 
conditions—both at individual workplaces as well as nation-wide, and involving 
multiple workplaces and companies—have been taking place during the 
pandemic at McDonald’s, Whole Foods, and many other workplaces. As with 
Amazon, some of these episodes have also resulted in employment repercussions 
for the employees involved.11 
Important to the discussion in this article, and our comparison with the 
Canadian situation, is that in many of these cases, including the Amazon 
example, employees, or organizations on their behalf, have brought unfair labour 
practice (ULP) complaints against their employers, pursuant to section 8(a)(1) 
of the NLRA to protect striking employees from negative consequences for these 
actions. Tese ULPs claim that the employer “interfere[d] with, restrain[ed], 
or coerce[d] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 [of 
the NLRA].”12 Section 7 guarantees employees the right to engage in “protected 
concerted activity” for “mutual aid or protection,” stating that: 
9. Amazonians United, “How Amazon Workers are Organizing for the Long Haul” (11 May 
2020), online: <www.labornotes.org/2020/05/how-amazon-workers-are-organizing-long-
haul> [perma.cc/G6LN-YH5H]; Caroline O’Donovan, “Te NLRB is Looking into Claims 
that Amazon Violated Employees’ Rights During the Coronavirus Pandemic” (18 April 
2020), online: <www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/federal-labor-regulators-
are-looking-into-claims-that> [perma.cc/DT5J-4UE]. 
10. Amazonians United, supra note 9; O’Donovan, supra note 9. Te NLRB administers and 
enforces the NLRA. 
11. See e.g. Jones, supra note 8; Greenhouse, supra note 1; Lauren Kaori Gurley, “Fast Foods 
Workers at 50 Restaurants Across California Are Going on Strike” Vice (8 April 2020), 
online: <vice.com/en_us/article/7kzyxz/fast-foods-workers-at-30-restaurants-across-
california-are-going-on-strike> [perma.cc/F4GH-VB8H]; Matt Day, “Whole Foods Workers 
Launch Sickout Protest. How Many Isn’t Clear” (31 March 2020), online: <bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2020-03-31/whole-foods-workers-launch-sick-out-protest-how-many-isn-t-
clear> [perma.cc/G5YJ-UDYD]. 
12. NLRA, supra note 5, §§ 7, 8(a)(1). As of 10 July 2020, multiple section 8(a)(1) ULP 
charges have been fled against Amazon and McDonald’s restaurants and one has been fled 
against Whole Foods. See O’Donovan, supra note 9; Tyler Sonnemaker, “Amazon is facing 
multiple inquiries from labor regulators into whether it unlawfully retaliated against workers 
who spoke out about its coronavirus response,” Business Insider (20 April 2020), online: 
<businessinsider.com/amazon-nlrb-inquiries-workers-protests-coronavirus-warehouse-
conditions-2020-4> [perma.cc/J83T-PY2X]. 
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection. 
II. WHAT ABOUT CANADIAN WORKERS? 
Canadian media reporting on concerted actions by Whole Foods employees in 
the US also reported on the lack of similar actions by workers at this company in 
Canada.13 Reporting on Amazon worker strikes, a journalist posed the question, 
“U.S. Workers Are Organizing Mass Strikes. Why Aren’t Canadian Workers?”14 
Indeed, there have been no media reports of strikes by employees in Canada 
during the pandemic at any of the prominent companies where we have seen 
worker action in the US, such as Amazon, McDonald’s, and Whole Foods. 
It is unlikely, however, that this is due to a lack of employee concerns about their 
workplace safety. Tere are reports of dissatisfaction with workplace conditions 
during the pandemic from Amazon workers in Canada, for example. In addition 
to an online petition in support of non-unionized Amazon workers in the 
Greater Toronto Area circulated by the non-union Warehouse Workers Centre 
organization, some of these workers have spoken to media at various times about 
their health and safety concerns, but did so confdentially and anonymously 
“because they say they fear losing their job for speaking out,”15 “feared reprisal for 
speaking to the media,”16 and with one worker saying “he’s certain he would be 
terminated if Amazon knew he had gone public with his concerns. ‘You’d lose your 
13. See Jackson & Shah, supra note 2 (“It’s not clear … whether a potential strike [by Instacart 
workers] would extend into Canada”); Te Associated Press, “U.S. Amazon and Instacart 
workers strike to protest COVID-19 hazards on the job,” CBC News (31 March 2020), 
online: <cbc.ca/news/business/amazon-instacard-coronavirus-1.5515868> [perma.cc/ 
BW8T-SUE8] (“Whole Worker, a workers group for Whole Foods employees, is calling for 
a country-wide ‘sick out’…. CBC News has been in touch with one of the organizers of the 
strike in the U.S., who said she was unaware of any plans for similar actions in Canada”). 
14. Noorsumar, supra note 3. 
15. Philippe de Montigny, “Amazon employees fag health concerns in Canadian warehouses,” 
CBC News (27 April 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/amazon-covid19-ca 
nada-1.5540594> [perma.cc/6LLV-PLJ8]. 
16. Sara Mojtehedzadeh, “As online orders surge, what about the Amazon workers?,” Te Toronto 
Star (19 March 2020), online: <thestar.com/news/canada/2020/03/19/as-online-orders-
surge-what-about-the-amazon-workers.html> [perma.cc/S4LH-MF8M]. 
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job for sure.’”17 More generally, concerns have been raised about the availability 
and adequacy of employees’ ability to refuse unsafe work under occupational 
health and safety legislation.18 Terefore, exploring the potential for employees 
to utilize labour law to engage in self-help to secure safe working conditions, 
as employees have been doing in the US, may be an important consideration 
for ensuring adequate and timely workplace protection for Canadian employees. 
While private sector, non-unionized workplaces in Canada have not seen 
the types of collective employee action that has been prominent in similar 
workplaces in the US during the pandemic, some protests by workers seeking 
safer workplaces or access to pandemic pay have occurred, although these appear 
to be uncommon. Where employee actions have occurred, several diferences 
from the US experience are evident. First, in Canada, typically public sector, 
unionized employees have been involved, as opposed to non-unionized, private 
sector employees as has been the case in the US. Te nature of the action has also 
been diferent: not only are Canadian employees rarely striking, but in some cases 
employees or their organizations have taken pains to emphasize that their actions 
are not strikes. 
In the public sector, for example, unionized transit workers in Toronto, 
Montreal, and Edmonton held spontaneous walk-outs or threats of strikes over 
17. Sean O’Shea, “Ontario Amazon whistleblower says company didn’t disclose coronavirus 
case to all,” Global News (5 May 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6905042/ 
coronavirus-amazon-brampton-warehouse-covid-19> [perma.cc/JZR3-2AEV]. 
18. While the number of work refusals under the OHSA, RSO 1990, c O.1 in the province 
rose during the pandemic, the Ministry of Labour, Training and Skills Development has 
been subject to criticism for upholding only one of the 280 cases arising between January 
and June 2020. Critics claim the Ministry has not taken worker concerns seriously. See Sara 
Mojtehedzadeh, “Many Ontario workers are trying to refuse work due to COVID-19 fears— 
but the government isn’t letting them,” Te Toronto Star (27 April 2020), online: <thestar. 
com/business/2020/04/27/many-ontario-workers-are-trying-to-refuse-work-due-to-covid-19-
fears-but-the-government-isnt-letting-them.html> [perma.cc/VFE8-AGBD]; Inayat Singh, 
“More Canadians are refusing work due to COVID-19—but it’s tough to get authorities 
to agree,” CBC News (22 June 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/ work-refusal-safety-
covid-1.5617787> [perma.cc/5TEP-ZYD2]; Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions, 
“Nurses launch investigation into Canada’s failure to protect health care workers from 
COVID-19” (22 June 2020), online: <nursesunions.ca/nurses-launch-investigation-into-
canadas-failure-to-protect-health-care-workers-from-covid-19> [perma.cc/9ZVF-ES7U]. 
Although the occupational health and safety regime may be available to address workers’ 
health and safety concerns, this article does not address that regime. 
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demands for safe working conditions and increased testing,19 while unionized 
hospital workers have held several Ontario-wide days of action in response to the 
lack of access to pandemic pay for all hospital workers. Tese protests have not 
involved strikes, but rather the collective wearing of stickers, and holding up of 
signs at coordinated times,20 and rallies by workers during non-working hours.21 
Work stoppages have been rare.22 Notably, some doctors were reported to have 
discussed, in private Facebook groups, the possibility of refusing to work due to 
the lack of protective equipment.23 At a residential care home in Markham, the 
majority of staf walked out after management informed them that a number of 
19. Carl Bronski, “Walkouts by Canadian transit workers protest lack of COVID-19 protections” 
World Socialist Web Site (20 April 2020), online: <wsws.org/en/articles/2020/04/20/ttcw-a20. 
html> [perma.cc/5TZU-93BM]; Bryann Aguilar, “Eight TTC maintenance workers walk 
of job as union demands more COVID-19 testing,” CTV News (18 April 2020), online: 
<toronto.ctvnews.ca/eight-ttc-maintenance-workers-walk-of-job-as-union-demands-more-
covid-19-testing-1.4902579> [perma.cc/N9U4-X5ME]. 
20. Aguilar, supra note 19; Canadian Union for Public Employees, “CUPE, SEIU, and UNIFOR 
will Hold Day of Action on June 17 Calling for Pandemic Pay for All Hospital Workers” (15 
June 2020), online: <cupehospitals.ca/news/cupe-seiu-and-unifor-will-hold-day-of-action-
on-june-17-calling-for-pandemic-pay-for-all-hospital-workers> [perma.cc/Q9XD-29FF]; 
Taylor Blewett, “Ottawa hospital workers protest exclusion from pandemic pay,” Ottawa 
Citizen (2 June 2020), online: <ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/ottawa-hospital-
workers-protest-exclusion-from-pandemic-pay> [perma.cc/NKZ8-72VU]; Ted Raymond, 
“Health-Care Workers at Queensway Carleton to Protest Tursday for Expanded 
Pandemic Pay in Hospitals” (14 May 2020), online: <iheartradio.ca/newstalk-1010/news/ 
health-care-workers-at-queensway-carleton-to-walk-out-thursday-in-support-of-expanded-
pandemic-pay-1.12410178> [perma.cc/9Y52-Z2PV]; Ontario Council of Hospital Unions 
& Canadian Union of Public Employees, “Day of Action—May 6” (5 May 2020), online: 
<ochu.on.ca/2020/05/05/day-of-action-may-6> [perma.cc/H57A-FNRL]. 
21. Blewett, supra note 20; Raymond, supra note 20; 101.3 myFM News staf, “COVID-19: 
Hospital workers strike due to lack of pandemic pay,” 101.3 Milton Now (14 May 2020), 
online: <www.miltonnow.ca/2020/05/14/covid-19-hospital-workers-strike-due-to-lack-of-
pandemic-pay> [perma.cc/YM5J-TFTR]. 
22. CBC News, “‘State of emergency’ at Markham facility for adults with disabilities after staf 
walk away over COVID-19,” CBC News (10 April 2020), online: <cbc.ca/news/ canada/ 
toronto/participation-house-critical-need-ppe-staf-1.5529384> [perma.cc/87MU-LQL9]; 
101.3 myFM News staf, supra note 21. 
23. Stephen Maher, “Fear and anger on the frontlines: What happens if there aren’t enough 
masks?” Maclean’s (30 March 2020), online: <macleans.ca/news/canada/fear-and-anger-on-
the-frontlines-what-happens-if-there-arent-enough-masks> [perma.cc/4RJG-RWUJ] (“Some 
Canadian doctors are talking about walking of the job if they’re not provided with adequate 
equipment to protect themselves from infection”). Physicians in Canada are not unionized, 
although provincial medical associations engage in collective representation and bargaining 
on behalf of physicians. 
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residents and staf had contracted COVID-19. However, a union representative 
publicly stated that “[t]his was not a mass action, not a job action, not a strike.”24 
Tere have been some instances of private sector, unionized employees taking 
action.25 Perhaps most prominent has been the case of unionized meat-packing 
employees. By early May 2020, Cargill’s High River Alberta meat-packing facility 
was reported to be the site of North America’s largest COVID-19 outbreak.26 
An early request for a stop work order from Alberta Occupational Health and 
Safety was denied.27 In early May, as the plant moved towards re-opening following 
temporary closure after the COVID-19 death of a worker, a multi-day protest 
was held outside the High River plant, with participants from the employees’ 
union, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), and other 
union organizations.28 Notably, the UFCW stated “[w]e’re not on strike and 
we’re not asking people not to go to work.”29 Te UFCW has also fled a ULP 
complaint against the employer and the provincial government.30 
24. CBC News, supra note 22. 
25. Michael Wayland, “Work stoppage over coronavirus fears temporarily shuts down Fiat 
Chrysler plant in Canada,” CNBC (13 March 2020), online: <www.cnbc.com/2020/03/13/ 
coronavirus-fat-chrysler-plant-workers-walk-out-in-canada.html> [perma.cc/C7M5-XTFA] 
(automotive plant workers engaged in one-day strike over fears of infected co-worker); Nina 
Grossman, “No sanitization, no workers: Victoria tradespeople walk of job,” Nanaimo News 
Bulletin (21 March 2020), online: <www.nanaimobulletin.com/news/no-sanitization-no-
workers-victoria-tradespeople-walk-of-job> [perma.cc/3DMX-L9KE] (construction workers 
walked-of sites objecting to unsanitary working conditions). 
26. “Meat Packers say Cargill Ignored their Concerns about Deadly COVID-19 Outbreak 
at Alberta Slaughterhouse,” Press Progress (14 May 2020), online: <pressprogress.ca/ 
meat-packers-say-cargill-ignored-their-concerns-about-deadly-covid-19-outbreak-at-alberta-
slaughterhouse> [perma.cc/2BUL-J2RJ]. 
27. Kathryn Blaze Baum, Carrie Tait & Tavia Grant, “How Cargill became the site of Canada’s 
largest single outbreak of COVID-19,” Te Globe and Mail (3 May 2020), online: <www. 
theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-cargill-became-the-site-of-canadas-largest-single-
outbreak-of> [perma.cc/UEN4-GFN2]. 
28. Stephanie Tomas, “Protests continue at Alberta’s Cargill meat processor where 949 workers 
tested positive for COVID-19,” CTV News (6 May 2020), online: <calgary.ctvnews.ca/ 
protests-continue-at-alberta-s-cargill-meat-processor-where-949-workers-tested-positive-for-
covid-19-1.4927353> [perma.cc/JJ39-MTXY]. 
29. Kaylen Small, Adam MacVicar & Melissa Gilligan, “Coronavirus: Cargill meat-packing 
plant in High River, Alta., reopens amid ongoing talks with union,” Global News (3 May 
2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6900280/coronavirus-cargill-union-talks-alberta> 
[perma.cc/59B2-G46H]. 
30. United Food and Commercial Workers Canada Union, Local No 401 v Cargill Limited and 
Government of Alberta (1 May 2020), online: <gounion.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ 
UFCW-ULP-Complaint-to-ALRB-2020-05-01.pdf> [perma.cc/J2MK-3V3T]. As of this 
writing, a decision has not been issued in this matter. 
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Overall, what we have not seen in Canada are strikes by non-unionized, 
private sector employees as a widespread phenomenon, which has been among 
the most notable features of the phenomenon in the US.31 
III. NLRA PROTECTION FOR CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND 
FROM ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS 
Te NLRA is the primary collective bargaining statute in the US, applicable 
to most of the private sector, providing rights and protections to workers who 
satisfy the statutory defnition of “employee.”32 While the NLRA is commonly 
criticized as being less protective of employee collective rights than is Canadian 
labour law,33 not only does the NLRA difer from Canadian labour legislation in 
several ways, but in some key respects it ofers greater protection to fundamental 
employee rights.34 
First, as Michael Duf has recently pointed out, it is a common, but mistaken, 
belief that the NLRA applies only to unionized employees and workplaces.35 
Neither unionization, nor the intention to unionize, is a requirement for access 
to NLRA protections.36 Te NLRA ofers protection to non-unionized, private 
31. Robert Combs, “Analysis: COVID-19 Has Workers Striking. Where Are the Unions?” (14 
April 2020), online: <news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-COVID-19-
has-workers-striking-where-are-the-unions> [perma.cc/7KKE-UKGZ]. 
32. Excluded employees (such as public sector, agricultural and domestic workers, managers and 
supervisors, railway and airline workers) and non-employee workers (such as independent 
contractors) fall outside the scope of the NLRA and have no to access to its protections. See 
NLRA, supra note 5, § 2(2). Public sector postal employees are an explicit exception to the 
NLRA’s lack of coverage of public sector employees. See Postal Reorganization Act, 39 USC 
§ 101 (1970). Unlike Canadian labour law, discussed below, the NLRA does not regard 
dependent contractors as employees, thus they are excluded from the Act. 
33. See e.g. Jefrey Sack, “U.S. and Canadian Labour Law: Signifcant Distinctions” (2010) 25 
ABA J Labor & Employment 241 at 241, 257; Fergal O’Brien & Zoe Schneeweiss, “U.S. 
Ranked Worst for Workers’ Rights Among Major Economies” (18 June 2020), online: 
<bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-18/u-s-ranked-worst-for-workers-rights-among-
major-economies> [perma.cc/6Y7B-Z6ZW]. 
34. Lance A Compa, “Te Wagner Model and International Freedom of Association Standards” 
in Autonomie collective et droit du travail: Melanges en l’honneur du Professor Pierre Verge ed by
Dominic Roux (Presses de l’Université Laval, 2014) 427 at 437. 
35. Michael C Duf, “New Labor Viscerality? Work Stoppages in the ‘New Work,’ Non-Union 
Economy” 65 St Louis U LJ [forthcoming in 2021], online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
3637605>, at 11. 
36. See NLRB v Modern Carpet Indus, 611 F (2d) 811 at 813 (10th Cir 1979) [Modern Carpet]; 
Ontario Knife Co v NLRB, 637 F (2d) 840 at 843 (2d Cir 1980) [Ontario Knife]; NLRB v 
Washington Aluminum Co, 370 US 9 (1962) [Washington Aluminum]. 
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sector employees, such as those engaging in the strikes and other collective actions 
we have seen during the pandemic.37 Tere are two primary sources of protection 
available under this legislation to both unionized and non-unionized employees 
engaging in concerted action (including strikes due to health and safety concerns), 
neither of which has a counterpart in Canadian labour legislation generally, 
or the OLRA specifcally. Tese are the NLRA section 7 protected concerted 
activity provision and the section 502 abnormally dangerous work provision. 
As explained below, NLRA section 7 is of greater relevance to non-unionized 
employees, so is given greater attention here. 
A. PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
NLRA section 7 provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”38 
Tese rights are held by individual employees, and apply to all employees within 
the scope of the NLRA, whether or not they are unionized or even seeking 
to unionize or engage in collective bargaining.39 Tese rights extend to eforts 
to improve working conditions through “channels outside the immediate 
employer-employee relationship,” including “resort to administrative and 
judicial forums” and “appeals to legislators to protect their interests,”40 which can 
apply even where employees have not approached their employers with specifc 
demands or complaints before taking action,41 and employees need not be correct 
in whole or in part regarding the underlying complaint motivating their action, 
provided that they have acted in good faith.42 
Limits to section 7 NLRA protection exist. Activity that is insubordinate, 
disobedient, disloyal, illegal, destructive, or engaged in in an abusive manner 
37. Sheppard, Mullin, Richert & Hampton LLP discussed an example of the lengthy list of 
employee actions related to COVID-19 workplace concerns that may fall within the scope of 
protected concerted activity. See Sheppard, Mullin, Richert & Hampton LLP, “Labor Issues 
Concerning COVID-19 and Government ‘Stay at Home’ Orders” (20 March 2020), online: 
<martindale.com/legal-news/article_sheppard-mullin-richter-hampton-llp_2527663.htm> 
[perma.cc/9JCG-BUFL]. 
38. NLRA, supra note 5, § 157. 
39. NLRB v Magnavox Co of Tennessee, 415 US 322 (1974); Modern Carpet, supra note 36;
Ontario Knife, supra note 36; Washington Aluminum, supra note 36. 
40. Eastex Inc v NLRB, 437 US 556, 565-66 (1978). 
41. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 36 at 14; NLRB v Empire Gas Inc, 566 F (2d) 681 at 
684 (10th Cir 1977). 
42. See Modern Carpet, supra note 36 at 814. 
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may not be protected, and a balancing test is applied to determine whether these 
limits have been reached.43 Te NLRB has found that collective employee actions 
in protest over what employees honestly believe to be unsafe working conditions 
can be protected concerted activity within the meaning of section 7.44 To fall 
within section 7, the activity must be both “concerted” and for “mutual aid 
or protection.”45 For activity to be considered “concerted,” the NLRB requires 
“that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not 
solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.”46 However, activity need not 
be supported by a majority of employees to be “concerted.”47 “Individual griping 
and complaining” about an individual issue often fails to satisfy the “mutual 
aid or protection” requirement, in addition to failing to be concerted activity.48 
Tis does not exclude the possibility of individual employee actions qualifying 
as concerted activity. In some circumstances, where it is not simply a complaint 
about a matter of concern to an individual, actions of individual employees may 
be considered to be concerted activity. Examples include where an individual, 
though not a designated spokesperson, brings a group complaint to the attention 
of management, and more generally, where there is evidence of group activities 
even if not “specifcally authorized” in a formal sense; where individuals “seek 
to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action”; where individuals bring 
“truly group complaints” to management’s attention; and where individual 
activity is “looking toward group action.”49 Te NLRB recently clarifed that 
“individual griping” does not constitute concerted activity simply where it occurs 
in the presence of other employees and management, and that it “includes the 
use of the frst-person plural pronoun” unless it is truly a group complaint being 
43. See Atlantic Steel, 245 NLRB 814 (1979); NLRB v IBEW Local No 1229, 346 US 464 
(1953); Mastro Plastics Corp v National Labor Relations Bd, 350 US 270 (1956). 
44. Tamara Foods Inc, 258 NLRB 1307 (1981) [Tamara]. “It has long been established that 
Section 7 of the Act protects the rights of employees to engage in protests, including work 
stoppages, over what the employees believe to be unsafe or unhealthy working conditions” 
(ibid at 1308). 
45. Alstate Maintenance LLC, 367 NLRB No 68 at 2 (2019). 
46. Meyers Industries, Inc, 268 NLRB 493 (1984) [Meyers I]; see also Ontario Knife, supra
note 36 at 845. 
47. NLRB v Jasper Seating Co, 857 F (2d) 419 at 422 (7th Cir 1988) cited in Duf, supra note 35 
at 11 (“Nothing in the Act, however, limits the rights of non-unionized employees to engage 
in concerted conduct for their mutual aid regardless of whether or not their goal is supported 
by a majority of employees”). 
48. Rita Gail Smith & Richard A Parr II, “Protection of Individual Action as Concerted Activity 
under the National Labor Relations Act” (1982) 68 Cornell L Rev 369 at 375. 
49. Meyers I, supra note 46; Ontario Knife, supra note 36 at 844-45; Meyers Industries Inc, 281 
NLRB 882 at 886-87 (1986) [Meyers II]. 
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brought to management’s attention, or the “totality of the circumstances must 
support a reasonable inference that in making the statement, the employee was 
seeking to initiate, induce or prepare for group action.” Te NLRB identifed 
several factors that would tend to support such an inference.50 
Te “mutual aid or protection” component of NLRA section 7 has been 
interpreted broadly such that it includes “almost any activity that somehow 
afects the well-being of the employees as a group.”51 Tough wide-reaching, 
this element is still meaningful as some concerted activities fail this second 
requirement because they have unprotected objectives that do not qualify as 
“mutual aid and protection.”52 
ULP provisions, found in section 8, address violations of NLRA section 7 
rights. While other section 8 ULPs may also apply in a particular case, section 
8(a)(1) speaks specifcally to section 7, providing that an employer must not 
“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7.”53 Te NLRB General Counsel initially bears the burden 
of proving, prima facie, that protected concerted activity was a substantial or 
motivating factor in the employer’s impugned action.54 A causal relationship must 
exist between the protected activity and the impugned employer action.55 Te 
burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have engaged 
in the same action in the absence of the protected activity.56 Employer action 
partially motivated by the protected activity will be sufcient to fnd a breach of 
section 8(a)(1).57 
50. Alstate Maintenance LLC, supra note 45 at 7. 
51. Smith & Parr, supra note 48 at 374. 
52. Ibid. 
53. NLRA, supra note 5, § 158. ULP charges relating to protected concerted activity are generally 
brought pursuant to sections 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3). 
54. NLRB v Wright Line, a Div of Wright Line Inc (1980), 251 NLRB 1083, af’d 662 F (2d) 899 
(1st Cir 1981). Te certifcation was then later denied. See NLRB v Wright Line, 455 US 989 
(1982) [Wright Line]. 
55. Te Wright Line test was recently clarifed such that “To meet the General Counsel’s initial 
burden, the evidence of animus must support fnding that a causal relationship exists 
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action against the 
employee.” Tschiggfrie Properties, 368 NLRB No. 120 at 1 (2019). 
56. Wright Line, supra note 54. 
57. See NLRB v Elias Bros. Restaurants Inc, 496 F (2d) 1165 at 1167 (6th Cir 1974); Jim Causley 
Pontiac v NLRB, 620 F (2d) 122 at 126 (6th Cir 1980). 
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B. PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY AND STRIKES 
NLRA section 13 provides an express statutory right to strike, although limits 
exist on legal strikes, depending on the object, purpose, timeliness, or conduct of 
strikers.58 Without canvassing the full complexities of NLRA strike law, it can be 
said that it contains roughly similar limitations on lawful strikes as does Canadian 
labour law,59 although several features of strikes under the NLRA that difer 
from the Canadian approach merit mention here. First, unlike under Canadian 
labour legislation, “no-strike” provisions prohibiting strikes during the term of 
a collective agreement or imposing procedural requirements for a strike to be 
lawful are not found in the NLRA, but are generally negotiated in agreements.60 
Where a strike breaches a no-strike provision, it is not protected activity. In such 
cases, striking employees can be disciplined, including terminated without the 
employer committing a ULP.61 Strike activity can also fall within the scope of 
NLRA section 7, including strikes over unsafe working conditions, which can 
protect strikers, including non-unionized employees, from employer retaliation, 
termination, or permanent replacement.62 
Second, under the NLRA, striking employees have less protection from 
permanent replacement than under Canadian labour law. Te NLRB distinguishes 
between lawful strikes that are either “economic” or “ULP”; employees’ rights 
to return to work vary with the type of strike, and a strike may convert from 
one type to another.63 Economic strikes seek to gain an economic concession 
from the employer, including improved working conditions. Economic strikers 
cannot be terminated, although they can be permanently replaced and they have 
limited rights to reinstatement. In contrast, ULP strikes respond to an action 
by the employer. ULP strikers cannot be terminated nor permanently replaced 
58. Section 13 provides that “[n]othing in this Act … except as specifcally provided for 
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way 
the right to strike or to afect the limitations or qualifcations on that right.” See National 
Labor Relations Board, “Te Right to Strike” (n.d.), online: <www.nlrb.gov/strikes> 
[perma.cc/66TG-82FV]. 
59. Treatment of secondary strikes is a notable exception but not addressed here as it is not 
germane to this discussion. See also Brishen Rogers & Simon Archer, “Protecting Concerted 
Action Outside the Union Context” (2017) 20 Can Lab & Emp LJ 141 at 153-54 (general 
discussion of strikes). 
60. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 46, 79. An exception is NLRA, § 8(g) (imposing a pre-strike 
notice period for health care workers). 
61. National Labor Relations Board, supra note 58. 
62. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 36; Tamara, supra note 44. 
63. In contrast, Canadian labour law provides more substantial rights to return to work and 
protection from permanent replacement. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, s 80 (reinstatement). 
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and they have greater rights to reinstatement than economic strikers.64 Tis 
applies to both unionized and non-unionized striking employees. NLRA section 
7 strikes, particularly the pandemic strikes addressed here, are likely considered 
to be economic strikes, as they seek to compel the employer to improve 
working conditions. 
Finally, unlike Canadian labour law, the NLRB distinguishes between 
“repeated” strikes, in which each incidence relates to a separate employer act or 
problem, which are protected, and “intermittent” strikes, which don’t relate to a 
separate employer act or problem, and which are utilized for the purpose of being 
more damaging to the employer or less taxing for the employees. Tese types of 
strikes are not protected.65 Describing the boundary between protected repeated 
strikes and unprotected intermittent strikes as “hazy,” Duf notes that this could 
be problematic for non-unionized employees, as they may not realize that such a 
distinction exists.66 
In sum, NLRA section 7 protection of strike activity may be available 
to unionized employees without a “no-strike” clause and to non-unionized 
employees, but is not available to non-employees or workers otherwise outside 
of the scope of the NLRA. However, as detailed by Brishen Rogers and Simon 
Archer, protected concerted activity, at least as it operates within the NLRA, has 
several important shortcomings including: limitations on the scope of protected 
conduct; imbalance between employers’ and employees’ entitlements; inadequate 
enforcement and remedies; and the de jure or de facto exclusion of many workers 
from the scope of the legislation.67 
C. STRIKES AND ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS 
A second NLRA provision available to protect both unionized and non-unionized 
employees who are within the scope of the NLRA is the seldom litigated section 
502. It operates to prevent employee actions that would otherwise constitute a 
strike under the NLRA from being considered to be a strike, converting them 
into a non-strike work stoppage for the purposes of the Act by providing that: 
64. National Labor Relations Board, supra note 58. 
65. See Duf, supra note 35 at 18-19. Duf provides a detailed explanation of these principles. See 
also Walmart Stores Inc, 368 NLRB No 24 (2019). Duf contends that this recent decision 
may expand the application of the intermittent strike concept. 
66. Duf, supra note 35 at 11, 18, 29. Duf outlines recommendations for an explicit rebuttable 
presumption to apply in such cases. 
67. Rogers & Archer, supra note 59 at 153-60. Te authors also identify some limitations arising 
from competition law and common law. See also Duf, supra note 35 at 9, 46-47. Duf 
outlines competition law constraints, particularly with respect to independent contractors. 
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the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of 
abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such 
employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under this Act.68 
Protecting a work stoppage from constituting a strike under the NLRA is 
particularly signifcant for unionized employees with “no-strike” clauses in their 
collective agreements, because the employees will then not have violated this 
agreement provision and, therefore, they will not be subject to an injunction, 
civil liability, permanent replacement, or termination, although employers can 
still use temporary replacement workers.69 
In order for section 502 to protect a work stoppage, it must be demonstrated 
on a preponderance of evidence that: 
the employees believed in good-faith that their working conditions were abnormally 
dangerous; that their belief was a contributing cause of the work stoppage; that 
the employees’ belief is supported by ascertainable, objective evidence; and that the 
perceived danger posed an immediate threat of harm to employee health or safety.70 
An “abnormally dangerous” working condition is an “identifable, presently 
existing threat to the employees’ safety,” though can include “risks that are 
ordinarily present [that have] intensifed,” but don’t include risks that are inherent 
in the job.71 Neither a “subjective impression or danger” nor a “speculative doubt 
about safety in general” will be sufcient.72 Notably, safety concerns need not be 
the sole motivation for the work stoppage,73 and there is no requirement that the 
activity be concerted; therefore, it is available to individual employees. 
D. NLRA PROTECTIONS FOR STRIKERS 
In sum, the NLRA contains two provisions—section 7 protected concerted activity 
and section 502 abnormally dangerous conditions work stoppages—which can 
be relevant to strike activity and to health and safety related strikes in particular. 
Tese provisions operate in diferent ways. NLRA section 7, applicable to a 
broad array of concerted action for mutual aid or protection, provides protection 
68. NLRA, supra note 5, §143. 
69. Duf, supra note 35 at 16; TNS Inc, 329 NLRB 602 (1999) [TNS Inc]. 
70. Ibid. See also Gateway Coal Co v United Mine Workers of America, 414 US 368 at 386-87 
(1974) [Gateway]. 
71. Gateway, supra note 70 at 386; TNS Inc, supra note 69 at 607; Carl H Coleman, “Beyond 
the Call of Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals to Work during an Infuenza 
Pandemic” (2008) 94 Iowa L Rev 1 at 16. 
72. TNS Inc, supra note 69 at 607. 
73. Ibid. 
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to strike activity, sheltering employees from retaliation and employment 
consequences through the ULP provisions. It requires only a good-faith belief by 
employees in the complaint underlying the action, which need not be objectively 
reasonable or wholly correct. Section 502 applies only to employee action that 
would otherwise be a strike, causing it to be treated as a non-strike work stoppage 
instead, thereby protecting employees from consequences of an unlawful strike, 
which would arise from violating a “no-strike” collective agreement clause. 
Te test for section 502 protection is more stringent than that for section 7. 
Te section 7 test is “essentially a subjective standard,” while section 502 work 
refusals must be based on “ascertainable, objective evidence of an abnormally 
dangerous condition.”74 Section 502 requires a good-faith belief in “abnormally 
dangerous” working conditions posing an immediate threat, and demonstration 
of “ascertainable, objective evidence.”75 Terefore, section 502 is of greater use to 
unionized employees with a “no-strike” clause in their collective agreements. Both 
provisions are available to unionized employees and non-unionized employees 
alike. Non-employee workers— such as independent contractors, or those 
excluded from application of the Act—do not have access to these protections. 
IV. EMPLOYEE FREEDOMS AND STRIKES UNDER CANADIAN 
LABOUR LAW 
Utilizing the OLRA as broadly representative of Canadian labour legislation, 
this section outlines the opportunities, protections, and consequences for three 
categories of workers engaging in strikes over fears of workplace safety: unionized 
employees, non-unionized employees, and workers such as non-employees who 
are excluded from the Act. 
Te modern era of Canadian collective bargaining legislation commenced 
with passage of PC 1003 in 1944, which became the model for legislation in 
jurisdictions across the country. PC 1003 adopted elements of the original 
US “Wagner Act” NLRA, passed in 1935.76 Consequently, Canadian labour 
legislation is commonly referred to as “Wagner model” legislation. However, 
labour legislation in Canada developed in a very diferent social, economic, and 
74. Tese contrast with the subjective-objective standard required for occupational health and 
safety work refusal, which must be both in good faith and have a reasonable basis. See Mark 
A Rothstein, Occupational Safety and Health Law, 2020 ed (Tomson West) § 20:6. 
75. TNS Inc, supra note 69. 
76. “Wagner model,” refers to the US NLRA as it was originally passed in 1935, refecting the 
name of its key sponsor, Senator Wagner. 
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political context than had the NLRA, and it departs from the Wagner model 
and the current NLRA in several important respects, particularly with regard 
to the scope of employee freedoms and regulation of strikes.77 In contrast with 
the NLRA’s emphasis on statutory rights, Canadian labour legislation focused 
on ensuring industrial peace, and suppressing strikes and worker militancy. Te 
fundamental deal struck with labour in modern Canadian collective bargaining 
legislation is that union recognition and collective bargaining are provided in 
exchange for restrictive union certifcation and strikes.78 Tese diferences in 
orientation and purpose are refected in the texts of the statutes, and several of 
these diferences are crucial to this discussion. 
In addition to the narrower scope of application of the legislation addressed 
above,79 the three statutory elements relevant to strikes in Canadian labour 
legislation are addressed below: the fundamental freedoms provision; limits 
and preconditions for lawful strikes, giving rise to an implied right to strike; 
protections for unionized employees in a legal strike, including that employment 
is not deemed to cease due to striking, in conjunction with right to return to work 
protections and ULP protections for employee freedom and rights under the Act. 
Treatment by the OLRA of strikes by non-unionized workers is then addressed. 
A. FREEDOM TO JOIN AND PARTICIPATE IN A TRADE UNION 
Te OLRA analogue to the NLRA section 7 protected concerted activity 
provision, as the linchpin of employee rights in the statute, is section 5 of the 
OLRA. As interpreted by the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB), section 
5 promises that every employee “is free to join a trade union of the person’s 
own choice and to participate in its lawful activities.”80 As such, it guarantees a 
signifcantly narrower scope of activities than does section 7, with the scope of 
77. See John Godard, “Labour Law and Union Recognition in Canada: A Historical- 
Institutionalist Perspective” (2013) 38 Queen’s LJ 391 (presenting a historical-institutionalist 
analysis of the reasons for and future implications of these diferences); Barry Eidlin, Labor 
and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 
(examining the origins of these diferences). 
78. Eidlin, supra note 77 at 233-34; see also Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, “Te Freedom to Strike 
in Canada: A Brief Legal History” (2009) 15 Can Lab & Emp LJ 333 at 348-52. 
79. See Part III of this article, supra. 
80. Although section 5 speaks of “every person,” the OLRB interprets this section as applying 
only to “employees.” See Brian Langille, “What Is a Strike” (2009) 15 Can Lab & Emp LJ 
355 at 365-66, citing Communications Workers of Canada v AAS Telecommunications Ltd, 
[1976] OLRB Rep 751; Jarvis v Associated Medical Services Inc, [1964] SCR 497. 
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protection limited to union-related activity by employees, and does not address 
non-unionized collective employee activities other than seeking to unionize. 
Te basic structure of the OLRA is that employees (including dependent 
contractors) fall within the statute, unless they are explicitly excluded. Common 
exclusions are managers, confdential labour relations workers, and specifed 
occupational and professional exclusions.81 Under the OLRA, excluded workers 
cannot be “employees” within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, are not 
subject to provisions applicable only to employees.82 Te Act is administered and 
enforced by the OLRB. 
B. REGULATION OF STRIKES 
In contrast with section 13 of the NLRA, the right to strike is not explicitly 
included in Canadian labour legislation or common law. Instead, as George 
Adams says, it “seems to have been implied into existence.”83 Te legislation 
incorporates a broad view of what constitutes strike activity. In common with 
almost all Canadian jurisdictions, the OLRA contains an “objective” defnition 
of strike: “includ[ing] a cessation of work, a refusal to work or to continue 
to work by employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a 
common understanding, or a slow-down or other concerted activity on the part 
of employees designed to restrict or limit output.”84 
81. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3. According to Langille, employees coming within each of 
these types of exclusions are treated the same by the OLRA with respect to strikes. See 
Langille, supra note 80. 
82. Langille, supra note 80. 
83. George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 1993) 
(loose-leaf, updated 2020, release 80) at 11.90. However, the Supreme Court of Canada 
recently recognized strikes as falling within the scope of the Charter s 2(d) guarantee of 
freedom of association, accepting that strikes are a necessary part of the process of collective 
bargaining. See Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4. 
84. OLRA, supra note 6, s 1. In contrast, collective bargaining legislation in Alberta, Manitoba, 
and Nova Scotia include a “subjective” element in the defnition of “strike,” requiring that 
the activity have as a purpose compelling the employer to settle a collective agreement. See 
Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c L-1, s 1(v); Labour Relations Act, RSM 1987, c L10, 
s 1; Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475, s 2(1)(v). Few jurisdictions exclude specifed types 
of activity from being considered a strike. Only British Columbia and New Brunswick 
exempt legal work refusals pursuant to workplace health and safety legislation from the strike 
defnition. See Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c 244, s 1(1) [BC Labour Relations Code]; 
Industrial Relations Act, RSNB 1973, c I-4, s 1(1)). However, a work stoppage based on a 
“disingenuous” safety concern can constitute a strike even in those jurisdictions. See Southam 
Inc, BCLRB No. B263/2000, rev’d in part BCLRB No. B328/2001. 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
   
624 
Although the defnition of strike is broad, and the legislation provides that 
employment is not deemed to cease only by reasons of striking, an array of 
statutory restrictions means that a strike is lawful only in limited circumstances.85 
Strikes are statutorily prohibited during the term of a collective agreement, and a 
“no-strike” provision must be included in every agreement and is deemed to exist 
should the agreement fail to include it.86 Even when an agreement has expired, 
two statutory preconditions must be satisfed for a strike to be lawful: a successful 
strike vote authorizing a strike, and exhaustion of the statutory conciliation 
process.87 Some jurisdictions also require advance written notice of strike 
commencement.88 In contrast, as noted above, such limitations on lawful strike 
activity are not found in the NLRA, though they may be found in voluntarily 
negotiated “no-strike” collective agreement provisions. 
Te combined efect of the strike defnition and preconditions for lawful 
strikes is that the OLRA, in common with legislation in other Canadian 
jurisdictions, only allows for one type of lawful strike—a bargaining strike—and 
only in certain, limited circumstances. In contrast, as described above, the NLRA 
contemplates a wider variety of potentially lawful or protected strikes: recognition 
and ULP strikes during the term of the agreement, in addition to economic 
strikes (a category including but broader than Canadian “bargaining” strikes).89 
C. OLRA PROTECTION FOR UNIONIZED STRIKERS 
Te OLRA guarantees employees the freedom to participate in lawful union 
activities and explicitly recognizes that the employment relationship continues 
to exist during lawful strikes.90 Striking employees also have substantial return to 
work rights that, in combination with ULP prohibitions and remedies, provide 
lawfully striking employees with broad protection from employer retaliation, 
including permanent replacement.91 
Employees engaged in lawful strikes are protected from employer retaliation 
and negative employment consequences by the statute’s ULP provisions; such 
strikes are lawful union activity guaranteed by the basic statutory section 5 
85. OLRA, supra note 6, s 1(2). 
86. OLRA, supra note 6, s 79(1). Mandatory grievance arbitration, rather than a strike, is the 
mid-term dispute resolution mechanism under the Canadian system. 
87. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 79, 79.1. 
88. See e.g. BC Labour Relations Code, supra note 84, s 60(6). 
89. “Recognition” refers to employer recognition of a union as the bargaining representative of a 
group of workers. See Langille, supra note 80 at 360-61 (for a detailed discussion). 
90. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(2), 5. 
91. See e.g. ibid, s 80. 
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freedom.92 For example, section 72 of the OLRA prohibits employer interference 
with this freedom by prohibiting an employer from: refusing to employ or 
continue to employ, or to discriminate against an employee for exercising his or 
her rights under the OLRA; imposing contract conditions that seek to restrain 
an employee from joining a union; and, using threats, promises, or other means 
to compel an employee not to join or to cease membership in a union or not 
exercise other rights under the OLRA.93 
A reverse onus applies to the main ULP provisions, such that the employer 
must establish on the balance of probabilities that its impugned conduct did not 
have an improper motive—that is, that it was not motivated in whole or in part 
by anti-union animus or related to union activity.94 Labour boards have broad 
jurisdiction to award compensatory remedies for ULP violations. An important 
limitation, and a key diference between US and Canadian collective bargaining 
legislation, is that these protections are available to employees during union 
organizing and once unionized, but not to employees who are neither unionized 
nor in the process of seeking union representation.95 
In the case of an unlawful strike, in addition to consequences for a union, 
individual employees may be subject to discipline, may be found to have violated 
statutory prohibitions on doing anything to cause an illegal strike, or may 
contravene a board illegal strike declaration or cease and desist order. Individuals 
or unions violating the legislation or any labour board decision, order, direction, 
or similar are subject to signifcant statutory monetary penalties, which accrue 
on a daily basis for each day that the contravention continues.96 Meanwhile the 
collective agreement and grievance arbitration machinery continue to apply, and 
the employer may still utilize the doctrine of fundamental breach.97 
92. Canadian Pacifc Railway Co v Zambri, [1962] SCR 609 [Zambri] (strikes are protected by 
the s 5 freedom). 
93. OLRA, supra note 6, s 72; Adams, supra note 83 at para 10.110. Additional ULP 
provisions prohibit: employer participation in or interference with the formation; selection 
or administration of, or representation by, a trade union (OLRA, supra note 6, s 70); 
intimidation or coercion to compel any person regarding union membership or exercising 
rights or obligations under the OLRA (ibid, s 76); persuading during working hours to 
join or not join a union (ibid, s 77); direct employer bargaining with union members (ibid,
s 73(1)); or, strike-breaking activities (ibid, s 78(1)). 
94. OLRA, supra note 6, s 96(5); Adams, supra note 83 at para 10.120. 
95. Rogers & Archer, supra note 59 at 148. 
96. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 6, s 104. 
97. OLRA, supra note 6, s 83; Adams, supra note 83 at para 11.90; McGavin Toastmaster v 
Ainscough, [1976] 1 SCR 718. Additional consequences outside of labour law, including 
competition law, common law tort, and contract law, may also be relevant. 
(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
626 
D. STRIKES BY NON-UNIONIZED WORKERS UNDER THE OLRA 
It is clear that the full array of protections and consequences under the OLRA is 
available to unionized employees engaging in lawful or unlawful strikes. However, 
whether and to what extent there exists a right to strike, and consequences for 
unlawful strikes, by non-unionized employees or for workers excluded from the 
statutory regime (such as independent contractors), are much more complicated 
questions under Canadian labour law than under the NLRA.98 Brian Langille 
notes that this is an “obscure” part of our law, and that “the dominance of the 
statutory scheme has orphaned any real legal analysis of strikes outside the statute, 
i.e., at common law. As a result, most of us have forgotten how to think about 
these matters.”99 
So, where does this leave workers who are explicitly excluded from the 
OLRA, non-employees such as independent contractors, and workers who are 
employees but not unionized nor seeking to unionize? 
1. STRIKES BY WORKERS EXCLUDED FROM THE OLRA 
Employees explicitly excluded from the OLRA do not have the beneft of section 5 
employee freedoms, which includes the freedom to strike.100 As a result, they lack 
the beneft of the basic ULP provisions. In the same way that the NLRA section 
8(a)(1) ULP provision refects the specifc language of NLRA section 7, the main 
OLRA ULPs (sections 72 and 76) refect section 5, including the specifc and far 
narrower language of the freedoms provided compared to the NLRA section 7. 
Te OLRA provides employees only the freedom to “join a trade union of [their] 
own choice and to participate in its lawful activities.” Correspondingly, the ULP 
provisions protect these freedoms, including other rights under the Act, from 
various types of violations: threats, promises, terminations, et cetera. What the 
OLRA neither promises as a freedom nor promises to protect are other forms of 
collective activity for workers ineligible to access section 5 freedoms.101 
98. Tis article does not address the Charter with respect to these questions, although see the 
conclusion for some comments in this regard. 
99. Langille, supra note 80 at 356. 
100. OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3. Section 1(3) provides that certain persons—such as managers, 
confdential employees, and specifed professionals—shall not be deemed to be “employees”; 
s 3 provides that the OLRA does not apply to certain occupations or specifed groups. 
101. Te main ULP provisions apply to persons, and section 97 of OLRA specifes that this 
includes non-employees excluded by section 1(3) but not those excluded by section 3. 
However, because ULPs efectuate the section 5 freedoms and the OLRB continues to 
interpret the section 5 freedoms as applying only to “employees,” the result is that neither 
category of excluded worker, in efect, has protection of the main ULP provisions. See OLRA, 
supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3, 5, 97; Langille, supra note 80 at 362-69. 
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However, these workers are not subject to the timeliness restrictions on legal 
strikes, which only apply to “employees.” Terefore, these workers are free of 
any statutory restrictions on strikes but are also free of any statutory protections 
for strikes.102 Consequently, these workers are governed by common law, and 
may face common law consequences for strike activity,103 as well as consequences 
arising from non-labour statutes, such as competition law. Langille describes the 
common law right to strike as follows: 
[I]t is the freedom of a group of workers, playing by the rules of contract termination, 
and acting for a certain purpose (i.e., (re)negotiations of their contract with the 
employer), to stop working in an efort to get the employer to come to terms. … 
But it is purely a freedom at common law, and one not protected by a perimeter of 
rights.104 
Langille asserts that, therefore, the key distinction between the statutory and 
common law freedoms to strike is the protection aforded by ULP provisions 
to the former.105 Workers subject only to the common law freedom to strike 
have no protection from employer retaliation or termination, and the employer 
has no obligation to reinstate or not to terminate these workers except as may 
arise from these workers’ individual contracts of employment or for service 
with the employer. 
2. STRIKES BY NON-EMPLOYEES 
For the same reasons (lack of access to section 5 statutory freedom to strike, 
with the consequent lack of protection for this freedom), non-employees such 
as independent contractors would be in the same position as workers explicitly 
excluded from the OLRA. As described above, they would be subject to the 
common law freedom to strike, and would be subject to all of the risks and 
consequences this might bring. 
3. STRIKES BY NON-UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES 
What, then, is the position of non-unionized employees who are not otherwise 
excluded from the OLRA? Tis may be the trickiest question, and it is the one 
most central to this inquiry. Unlike the types of workers described above (those 
excluded by sections 1(3) or 3 of the Act, or who are not “employees” within the 
102. Langille, supra note 80 at 364; OLRA, supra note 6, ss 1(3), 3. Langille is referring to workers 
excluded pursuant to the OLRA, ss 1(3), 3. 
103. Langille, supra note 80 at 368. 
104. Ibid at 368-69, citing Zambri, supra note 92. 
105. Ibid at 369. 
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meaning of the Act), non-unionized employees likely have access to the section 
5 freedoms, including the freedom to strike, even under the OLRB’s restrictive 
reading of this provision, and the main ULPs are available to such employees. 
So, on the face of it, it appears that these non-unionized employees may be in a 
similar situation as they would be under section 7 of the NLRA. Tis is the case, 
insofar as section 5 freedoms apply. As noted above, however, these freedoms are 
much narrower than the NLRA section 7 protected concerted activity guarantee. 
With regard to strikes, OLRA section 5 only includes lawful strikes as a form 
of “participation in lawful union activity,” and the relevant ULP protections, 
similarly, protect only lawful strikes. Terefore, only strikes that constitute a 
lawful activity of a trade union would fall within OLRA section 5 or the ULP 
provisions meant to ensure those freedoms. 
Assuming that non-unionized employees would not, or could not, satisfy the 
statutory prerequisites for a lawful strike applicable to employees, such a strike 
would not be lawful. Terefore, the fundamental freedom of union membership 
and ULP provisions would not be available to ofer these employees any recourse 
for or protection from employer retaliation, including discipline or discharge.106 
Tis lack of protection or recourse is true, more generally, of collective action 
taken by non-unionized employees in Canada and is not limited to strike 
activity. Minimum standards legislation and the common law of employment, 
to the extent that it would be applicable in any given case, would be their only 
recourse.107 Consequently, non-unionized employees would end up in the same 
position as excluded workers and non-employees—able only to exercise the 
common law freedom to strike, without statutory protections and with all the 
risks and liabilities this may bring. 
V. REVISITING PANDEMIC-RELATED STRIKES IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
Returning to the pandemic-related worker actions in the US and Canada 
described at the outset of this article, the apparent diferences between the 
countries in workers’ collective protests against unsafe working conditions can be 
explained by key diferences between US and Canadian labour legislation. 
106. Given the focus here on labour law, consequences of unlawful strike activity beyond labour 
law are not addressed here. 
107. See Langille, supra note 80 (regarding Canadian common law perspectives on strike activity). 
See Rogers & Archer, supra note 59 at 148 (for a summary of minimum standards legislation 
anti-retaliation provisions). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
SLINN, WORKER RIGHTS IN CANADA 629 
In the US, there were multiple incidents of non-unionized employees 
engaging in multiple forms of collective actions, including single-location 
and mass strikes. Some employees involved did sufer negative employment 
consequences and have claimed employer retaliation for participating in these 
actions. In many of these cases, it is likely that the NLRA section 7 protected 
concerted activity guarantee is applicable, which can be enforced through the 
Act’s ULP provisions. Indeed, media reports that multiple ULP charges have 
been fled in many of these cases. 
Addressing some of the same US pandemic work stoppages discussed here, 
Duf notes that NLRA section 7 protection likely protects those strikes relating 
to health and safety, as they are concerted activity that has a “tight connection 
to work condition.”108 However, writing in 2008, Carl Coleman considered 
whether risks arising from a pandemic would qualify as “abnormally dangerous” 
in health care workplaces, specifcally. He suggested that most of these workers 
could credibly claim that to be the case, but speculated that the courts may focus 
on foreseeable risk rather than on whether it is out of the ordinary, in which case 
health care work in a pandemic would not likely satisfy section 502.109 
While NLRA section 502 may also be available in such cases, as explained 
above, the beneft of the “non-strike work stoppage” designation this provision 
provides is primarily of value to unionized workers with “no-strike” provisions 
in their collective agreements. Given the limited scope of application and more 
onerous test for application of NLRA section 502 compared to section 7, it is more 
likely that these non-union actions were undertaken, or subsequently defended, 
pursuant to the protected concerted activity provision of the NLRA. Terefore, 
these non-unionized employees engaging in strikes were doing so with the same 
protection as (and, compared to unionized employees, subject to a “no-strike” 
clause, greater freedom than) unionized employees. 
In contrast, in Canada, we have not seen pandemic-related strikes by either 
non-unionized or unionized employees. Indeed, some non-unionized employees 
sought out media to publicize their concerns, expressing fear of employer 
retaliation. Even in the context of unionized workplaces, we have seen unions 
explicitly state that their actions were not strikes. 
As outlined above, and unlike under the NLRA, the scope for lawful, 
statutorily protected strike action is very narrow under Canadian labour law. 
Non-unionized employees have no means of accessing statutory strike protection. 
In the case of unionized employees, unless no collective agreement was in force 
108. Duf, supra note 35 at 15. 
109. Coleman, supra note 71 at 16. 
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and the various preconditions for a lawful strike had been satisfed (and they 
most likely were not in these cases), any strike would have been illegal, exposing 
the union and employees to an array of consequences. Terefore, non-unionized 
workers in Canada would be very unlikely to strike and would have no statutory 
labour law protection from employer retaliation or negative employment 
consequences, and so are likely very wary of taking any public action. Te limited 
scope for lawful strikes and the signifcant consequences to unions and employees 
of unlawful strikes are clear in the case of unionized employees, and explain why 
we have seen unions with unionized employees engaging in pandemic collective 
action emphasize that these actions were not strikes. 
VI. CONTEMPLATING PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
FOR CANADIAN EMPLOYEES 
As William Corbett notes, “Te scope of coverage of section 7 and its application 
to non-union employees may have been one of the best-kept secrets of labor law. 
It also may be one of the best means for protecting employee rights in the United 
States in the twenty-frst century.”110 Moreover, Lance Compa has pointed out 
that NLRA concerted activity protections are even more favourable to workers 
than International Labour Organization (ILO) standards because they protect 
“any form of ‘concerted activity … for mutual aid and protection,’ not just 
union activity.”111 
Others, including more recently Rogers and Archer, have suggested that 
Canadian labour legislation be amended to incorporate protection akin to the 
NLRA’s protected concerted activity provision.112 Focusing on the scope for such an 
amendment to support activities of workers’ centres that represent non-unionized 
employees, these authors didn’t address in detail necessary ancillary amendments, 
or strike regulation, in particular. However, Rogers and Archer contend that the 
“roughly symmetrical” relevant norms and processes under Canadian and US 
labour legislation suggest that there would be no signifcant impediments to 
adopting a provision similar to NLRA section 7 into Canadian labour legislation, 
and that such an addition would not signifcantly disrupt Canadian labour law 
or labour relations.113 Tey further suggest that such an amendment would be 
110. William R Corbett, “Waiting For the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything 
Old Is New Again” (2002) 23 Berkeley J Emp & Lab L 259 at 267. 
111. Compa, supra note 34 at 437. 
112. Rogers & Archer, supra note 59. 
113. Ibid at 160-61. 
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consistent with Canada’s international law commitments and with the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantee of freedom of association.114 
If Canadian labour legislation, such as the OLRA, was to be amended to 
include a guarantee of protection for concerted activity, what might that entail, 
not only with respect to statutory strikes, but also for other elements of the 
Canadian Wagner model? First, some straightforward technical amendments to 
the freedoms provision and to key ULP provisions would be necessary. Second, 
if this guarantee is to extend covering strikes as a form of protected concerted 
activity, some more complex changes and policy decisions would be necessary. 
Tese would include the scope of application of labour legislation including 
the nature of collective worker action it contemplates, and whether to provide a 
concrete foundation for minority unionism in labour legislation. 
A. ESTABLISHING THE GUARANTEE 
In order to establish protection for concerted activity, it would be necessary to 
amend the employee freedoms provision (section 5) to cover the more expansive 
range of activities encompassed by the NLRA section 7, reaching beyond 
organizing and collective bargaining to employee actions for “mutual aid or 
protection.” Such an amendment could simply involve adopting the language of 
section 7 in place of, or in addition to, the existing employee freedom language. 
As noted earlier, although the existing OLRA freedom provision applies to “every 
person,” this provision is interpreted more narrowly, to apply only to employees. 
Given that the Supreme Court of Canada and ILO bodies regard freedom of 
association as a guarantee that is not limited to employees, this would be an 
opportunity to re-establish a greater breadth of application for the section 5 
freedom provision.115 
Because employee freedoms are efectuated by the ULP provisions of the 
Act, it would also be necessary to amend these provisions (in particular, OLRA 
114. Note that others, including David Doorey “Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker 
Voice Beyond the Wagner Model” (2013) 38 Queen’s L.J. 511, and Alison Braley-Rattai 
“Harnessing the Possibilities of Minority Unionism in Canada” (2013) 38 Lab Stud J 321, 
identify section 7 of NLRA as reference points in their respective proposals for introducing 
supplementary forms of minority unionism into Canadian labour law systems, although 
neither addresses strikes as protected concerted activity. 
115. Breen Creighton & Shae McCrystal “Who Is a Worker in International Law” (2015) 37 
Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 691; Beatriz Vacotto, “Precarious Work and the Exercise of Freedom 
of Association and Collective Bargaining: Current ILO Jurisprudence” (2013) 5 Intl J Labor 
Res 117; ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 
(No. 87); ILO, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). 
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sections 72 and 76) to refect the expanded scope of employee freedoms. To avoid 
interpretive difculties, legislatures may consider adopting the approach taken in 
the NLRA. Tere, the relevant ULP provision (NLRA section 8(a)(1)) explicitly 
refers to the protected concerted activity guarantee, providing that it would 
be a ULP for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in 
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [NLRA] section 7.” As both the OLRA 
and the NLRA apply a reverse onus for such ULPs, no further change to ULP 
processes or provisions would be required.116 
B. STRIKES AND PICKETING 
In respect of strikes, the more interventionist and restrictive approach of Canadian 
labour legislation, compared to the NLRA, poses some challenges to extending a 
guarantee of protected concerted activity to strike activity in Canadian statutes. 
Tis may require policymakers to make some decisions about whether to 
continue with the Canadian practice of tightly regulating strikes and permitting 
only limited types of strikes, subject to numerous statutory preconditions, 
to be lawful. Tis is a departure that Canadian labour law has taken from the 
Wagner model, and diverges from the less interventionist approach taken by the 
NLRA to strikes. As explained above, the NLRA permits more types of strikes 
than does Canadian labour law and, rather than imposing preconditions on 
strikes to be lawful, leaves it to the bargaining parties to negotiate “no-strike” 
provisions in their collective agreements. Canadian policymakers may wish to 
consider whether, as under the NLRA, recognition or ULP strikes, in addition 
to bargaining strikes, could be lawful and whether, or to what degree, to leave 
it to the parties to impose limits or preconditions on strike activity. If a more 
restrictive approach to strikes is to be maintained, then explicit exceptions to the 
expanded employee freedom provision would be necessary to account for such 
limitations on concerted activity. 
In addition, and in any event for greater clarity and in consideration of the 
recent Supreme Court decision regarding the Charter protected right to strike, 
116. Although beyond the scope of this article, in light of recent Charter decisions regarding 
freedom of association protection of collective bargaining rights and Canada’s obligations 
under international law, expansion of application of employee freedoms beyond “employees” 
within the meaning of the Act may be due for consideration, as well as reconsideration of 
statutory exclusions from the Act. See Michael Lynk, A Review of the Employee Occupational 
Exclusions under the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 
2016). Tis report was prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Labour regarding continuing 
justifability of exclusions of non-employees and others from labour legislation in Canada. 
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legislators might contemplate adding an explicit right to strike to the legislation, 
as exists in NLRA section 13.117 
Finally, alongside strikes, the separate but often related activities of picketing 
and leafeting should also be contemplated as forms of protected concerted 
activity. While both are recognized as meriting Charter protection, if not under 
the freedom of association then the freedom of expression, picketing is subject 
to statutory regulation to diferent degrees in diferent Canadian jurisdictions.118 
In jurisdictions such as Ontario, where the legislation does not directly regulate 
picketing activity and picketing is largely governed by common law, amendments 
may not be necessary.119 
C. DIFFICULT QUESTIONS 
Finally, contemplating introducing protection for concerted activity into 
Canadian labour legislation may also give rise to some more difcult and 
fundamental policy questions. 
First, as seen in the examples introducing this article, NLRA section 7 can 
be utilized by employees for short-lived collective action that is divorced from 
the goals of union organizing or an ongoing collective bargaining relationship. 
However, Canadian labour legislation and interpretations of the Charter
freedom of association are oriented towards establishing and engaging in an 
enduring “collective bargaining relationship” between employers and trade 
union representatives of groups of workers.120 In contemplating incorporating 
protection akin to NLRA section 7 into Canadian labour legislation, these US 
experiences should prompt us to refect on whether this unconventional (by 
Canadian labour law standards, at least) form of associational activity—refecting 
mobilizing rather than organizing—reveals a diferent type of representation gap 
117. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4. 
118. U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v KMart Canada Ltd, [1999] 2 SCR 1083 (leafeting); R.W.D.S.U., 
Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd, 2002 SCC 8 (secondary picketing). 
119. In Ontario, picketing may give rise to a ULP under the OLRA where, for instance, it gives 
rise to a sympathy strike by other employees or the picketing involves threatening or coercive 
conduct. See OLRA, supra note 6, ss 76, 83. In jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, where 
the statute does govern picketing, amendments would be necessary. See BC Labour Relations 
Code, supra note 84, Part 5, for an example of statutory regulation of picketing. 
120. Tis type of collective action likely constitutes collective bargaining as it is understood 
by international labour law as these actions are for the purpose of pursuing employees’ 
workplace goals they likely constitute collective bargaining. See Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1981 (No. 154), International Labour Organization, 3 June 1981, Art 2. 
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afecting Canadian workers that should be addressed.121 Te experiences and 
examples of US employees suggest that short-lived associational activity may 
be of fundamental value to workers in a way that is distinct from conventional 
organizing and collective bargaining and, as such, is worthy of explicit protection. 
Second, introducing protection for concerted activity raises the question of 
whether policymakers are prepared to provide a statutory foundation for minority 
unionism in Canadian labour legislation. Minority unionism involves provision 
of representation or bargaining rights to a union as a result of having agreement 
(typically through membership) of less than a majority of employees. Neither 
certifcation nor majority support is required. Te most commonly discussed 
form of minority unionism is “members-only” unionism, whereby the union is 
able to represent only its members. Under the NLRA, section 7 is the explicit 
foundation for minority unionism. As currently interpreted by the NLRB and 
courts, it permits, but does not require, members-only minority unionism, such 
that an employer may, but is not required to, bargain with such unions.122 
Currently, Canadian labour law does not prohibit voluntary employee 
representation on a minority basis, much in the same way that most labour 
legislation permits voluntary recognition without expressly providing for it. 
Several scholars have advocated for forms of minority unionism to be adopted 
into or alongside existing Canadian labour legislation, arguing that doing so 
would be consistent with, or even required by, international law and the Charter
guarantee of freedom of association.123 However, critics caution against potentially 
destabilizing and undesirable efects of minority unionism, and jurists have been 
121. On the distinction between mobilizing and organizing in the labour context, see Jane 
Holgate, Melanie Simms & Maite Tapia “Te limitations of the theory and practice of 
mobilization in trade union organizing” (2018) 39 Econ & Indus Democracy 599. 
122. Catherine Fisk & Xenia Tashlitsky “Imagine a world where employers are required to bargain 
with minority unions” (2011) 27 ABA J Lab & Emp L 1. Some scholars, most notably 
Charles J Morris, Te Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American 
Workplace (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2005), contend that the text and legislative history of 
section 7 of NLRA supports mandatory minority union bargaining. 
123. See e.g. Doorey, supra note 114; Braley-Rattai, supra note 114; Roy J Adams “Bringing 
Canada’s Wagner Act Regime into Compliance with International Human Rights Law 
and the Charter” (2015) 19 Can Lab & Emp LJ 365; Mark Harcourt & Peter Haynes 
“Accommodating minority unionism: Does the New Zealand experience provide options for 
Canadian law reform” (2011) 16 Can Lab & Emp LJ 51. 
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wary of the potential chaos that could arise from employers facing bargaining 
with multiple unions.124 
VII.CONCLUSION 
While the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated worker activity arising from 
fears of unsafe working conditions during this time have brought this labour 
law secret into the headlines, it has also highlighted an important, but often 
overlooked, diference in employee protections between US and Canadian 
labour law. Tis diference centres on the narrow statutory freedoms granted 
by Canadian labour law, compared to the broader scope and application of the 
NLRA section 7 protected concerted activity guarantee. Although the pandemic 
is, hopefully, a passing episode, the importance of protected concerted activity for 
non-unionized workers should be an enduring concern. 
124. See e.g. Fisk & Tashlitsky, supra note 122; Brad Walchuk “Te Pitfalls of Embracing 
Minority Unionism” (2016) 6 J Workplace Rights 1; Compa, supra note 34. For discussion 
of Canadian jurists’ trepidation about minority unionism, see Adams, supra note 83; 
Fraser v Ontario (AG), 2008 ONCA 760 at para 92; Ontario (AG) v Fraser, 2011 SCC 20 
at paras 346-51. 

